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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.	
10/559,784	12/08/2005	Mitsuko Kosaka	64603(70904)	8189	
	7590 10/09/200 NGELL PALMER & D	EXAMINER			
P.O. BOX 5587		DUTT, ADITI			
BOSTON, MA 02205			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	
			1649		
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE	
			10/09/2009	PAPER	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)		
10/559,784	KOSAKA, MITSUKO		
Examiner	Art Unit		

	Aditi Dutt	1649	
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the c	correspondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED <u>15 September 2009</u> FAILS TO PLACE THI	S APPLICATION IN CONDITION F	OR ALLOWANCE.	
1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Apper for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C periods:	replies: (1) an amendment, affidavi eal (with appeal fee) in compliance	t, or other evidence, w with 37 CFR 41.31; or	which places the r (3) a Request
a) The period for reply expires <u>6</u> months from the mailing date	of the final rejection.		
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire la Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(the content of the co	dvisory Action, or (2) the date set forth ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailing b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	g date of the final rejection	on.
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	ension and the corresponding amount of hortened statutory period for reply origi	of the fee. The appropria nally set in the final Office	ate extension fee be action; or (2) as
2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed with AMENDMENTS	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the	
	and prince to the date of filings a brief	وحالم وسفوه والمعادية	
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, k (a) They raise new issues that would require further cor (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below 	nsideration and/or search (see NOT w);	TE below);	
(c) ☐ They are not deemed to place the application in bet appeal; and/or	ter form for appeal by materially red	ducing or simplifying ti	ne issues for
(d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a converse NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).	corresponding number of finally reje	ected claims.	
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12 5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):		mpliant Amendment (l	PTOL-324).
 Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all non-allowable claim(s). 		imely filed amendmer	nt canceling the
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) [how the new or amended claims would be rejected is prov The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed:		l be entered and an e	xplanation of
Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected: <u>7 and 8</u> .			
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: <u>1-6, 11-14</u> . AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, bubecause applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e). 			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary 	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appea and was not earlier presented. Se	al and/or appellant fail ee 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1	s to provide a).
10.	n of the status of the claims after er	ntry is below or attach	ed.
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered but <u>See continuation below.</u>	t does NOT place the application in	condition for allowan	ce because:
12. ☐ Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i> (s). (13. ☐ Other:	PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)		
/Jeffrey Stucker/	/A. D./		
Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 1649	Examiner, Art Unit 1649		

Continuation of 11: Does not place the application for condition of allowance because:

The rejection of claims 7-8 as being unpatentable over over Kosaka et al. (Exp Cell Res 245: 245-251, 1998) in view of Haruta et al., (Nat Neurosc 4: 1163-1164, 2001) is maintained for reasons of record in the last Office Action dated 7/15/09.

Applicant argues that the expression of neurofilament 200 (NF 200) in cells does not necessarily mean that these cells are retinal ganglion cells, especially because NF200 is expressed in many nerves. Applicant further alleges that Haruta et al do not describe the differentiation of iris pigment epithelial cells (IPE) to retinal ganglion cells. Applicant further argues that neural IPE cells can differentiate to retinal nerve cells was not known at the time of filing of the present application, "regardless of the fact that IPE cells and retinal nerve cells have common developmental origin". Applicant points out to the treatise by the present inventors that states the difficulty of inducing retinal cells from retinal pigment epithelial, further asserting the absence of cells positive for a photoreceptor cell marker. Applicant emphasizes that the obviousness rejection is incorrect based on th Graham factors particularly with respect to the aspect of predictability. Applicant concludes that at the time of filing of the instant Application, a peson of ordinary skill "could not predict that IPE cells can be differentiated into retinal nerve cells although IPE cells and retinal nerve cells have a common developmental origin".

Applicant's arguments are fully considered but not found to persuasive. Like the teachings of the treatise currently provided by Applicant, Haruta et al also teach that the cells do not express rhodopsin, a marker for rod photoreceptors. It is to be noted that the treatise teaches differentiation of retinal pigmented epithelial cells (RPE) and not IPE cells, as instantly claimed or as taught by Haruta et al. Even if the difference is disregarded, this issue is moot because arguments that rely on particular distinguishing features are not persuasive when those features are not recited in the claims, i.e. the claims do not require the differentiation to retinal photoreceptor cells. It is further reiterated that a retinal nerve cell can comprise a retinal visual cell, bipolar cell, Muller glial cells, etc. (instant specification, para 0040). Applicant is again reminded that "while the claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification, it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into claims. On the contrary, claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. See Ex parte Oetiker, 23 USPQ2d 1641 (BPAI, 1992). Please note that the claims define the subject matter of his invention and that the specification cannot be relied upon to read limitations into the claims.

Furthermore, although NF200 is a marker for many different nerves, the Haruta reference clearly implies that IPE cells expressing NF200 can promote retinal cell differentiation. The fact that Haruta teachings suggest the differentiation of IPE cells to retinal cells or retinal nerve cells and the fact that NF200 can be a marker for retinal nerve cells, contradicts Applicant's allegation that this knowledge was unknown at the time of filing of the application, and thereby one could not predict such differentiation. Furthermore, obviousness does not require absolute predictability, only a reasonable expectation of success, i.e., a reasonable expectation of obtaining similar properties. See, e.g., In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903, 7 USPQ2d 1673, 1681 (Fed. Cir.1988). Based upon the combined teachings and suggestion of the prior art, the person of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to try because IPE and the neural retina have a common developmental origin. As the source of the cells and the culture conditions in the prior art teachings and the currently claimed invention are the same, the claimed invention as a whole stands prima facie obvious over the combined teachings of the prior art and stay rejected.